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CLINICAL ETHICS
‘‘I can put the medicine in his soup, Doctor!’’
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The practice of covertly administering medication is con-
troversial. Although condemned by some as overly paterna-
listic, others have suggested that it may be acceptable if
patients have permanent mental incapacity and refuse
needed treatment. Ethical, legal, and clinical considerations
become more complex when the mental incapacity is
temporary and when the medication actually serves to
restore autonomy. We discuss these issues in the context of
a young man with schizophrenia. His mother had been
giving him antipsychotic medication covertly in his soup.
Should the doctor continue to provide a prescription, thus
allowing this to continue? We discuss this case based on the
‘‘four principles’’ ethical framework, addressing the conflict
between autonomy and beneficence/non-maleficence, the
role of antipsychotics as an autonomy restoring agent, truth
telling and the balance between individual versus family
autonomy.
C
overt administration of medication to an adult
patient—for example, concealing the medication in a
patient’s food or drinks without his or her knowledge,
is controversial. Commentators who condemn covert admin-
istration of medication argue that it is overly paternalistic
and deprives the patient of the right to make health care
decisions as well as his/her right to be told the truth.1 In
mentally capable patients, it is clearly a breach of autonomy
and thus unacceptable.2 In patients who may be mentally
incapacitated permanently or temporarily, the debate is
centred on whether the best interest of the patient is a
sufficient ethical justification for the practice. Concern has
also been raised that even if this practice may be condoned in
a few exceptional cases, such as in an emergency, any general
acceptance of such a practice may give rise to abuse.1 3
Specifically, it may become an ‘‘easy excuse’’ for not
discussing and explaining treatment to patients or their
families, and may also reinforce tolerance of poor staffing
levels or poor standards in patient care settings. These risks
are amplified when the practice remains unregulated and
unmonitored because of a lack of legal or professional
guidelines, and of the secrecy surrounding the practice due
to fear of professional censure.4
On the other hand, some commentators suggest that
concealing medication can be ethically acceptable for
mentally incapacitated patients in some circumstances. The
UK Central Council for Nursing Midwifery and Health
Visiting (UKCC) has, for example, issued guidance to nurses5
stating that ‘‘disguising medication in food or drink can be
justified in the best interests of patients who actively refuse
medication but who lack the capacity to refuse treatment’’.
Covert medication ‘‘may be considered to prevent a patient
from missing out on essential treatment where the patient is
incapable of informed consent’’. The guidelines emphasise
that such action should be taken only as a contingency
measure in an emergency, and after discussion with the
clinical team and the patient’s carers. Treloar et al4 argue in
favour of giving needed treatments to patients without
capacity to accept or refuse treatment, regardless of whether
the treatment is routine or emergency. They believe the harm
of ‘‘deceiving’’ a mentally incapable individual by concealing
medication would be outweighed by the harm of depriving
the patient of needed treatment, especially if covert admin-
istration of medication represents the least distressing or
least restrictive method of giving treatment. These writers
base their views on their empirical study6 on inpatient and
community units caring for patients with dementia. Their
study reveals that the practice of giving covert medication is
widespread in the UK, occurring in 71% of long stay care
units. Ninety six per cent of community carers considered
covert administration of medication, for both physical and
mental disorders, as justifiable in certain circumstances—for
example, if it were the only way to administer needed
treatment.
Many previous works on covert medication administration
have focused on people with long term mental incapacity—
for example, dementia or intellectual disabilities. As patients
with dementia have previously been mentally capable it is
worthwhile to examine their previously expressed wishes
about the proposed medication or about covert medication.
Otherwise, the discussion in dementia and intellectual
disabilities groups surrounds whether covert administration
of medication is necessary in the best interests of the
patients. Patients with fluctuating or temporary mental
incapacity provide a greater challenge because whether we
need to respect their wishes or make decisions on their behalf
based on their best interests would vary according to their
mental capacity at the relevant time. We report a case in
Hong Kong in which a mother gives antipsychotics mixed in
soup to her son with schizophrenia. The case raises important
ethical and legal issues. We discuss, based on the framework
of the ‘‘four principles of biomedical ethics’’ as proposed by
Beauchamp & Childress,7 (1) the conflict between the
principle of autonomy and the principles of beneficence and
non-maleficence; (2) the special considerations of the use of
antipsychotic medication that restores mental competence
and autonomy; (3) maintaining a balance between family
autonomy and individual autonomy, and (4) upholding the
principle of truth telling, which is based on respect for
autonomy.
CASE HISTORY
Y is a 25 year old unemployed man with a two year history of
paranoid schizophrenia. He lives with his parents and a
younger sister. During previous psychotic episodes, he had
persecutory delusions that his mother wanted to harm him,
with a history of violence against her. He had three previous
brief hospitalisations. Despite his excellent response to
antipsychotics, his insight into his illness was poor.
Discussions with his psychiatrist, Dr W, about the nature of
his illness and the need for maintenance antipsychotic
treatment often elicited angry and defiant responses from
Y. His adherence to medication regimens and follow up visits
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had, however, been mostly satisfactory because of super-
vision and support from his very caring mother, who
accompanied him to his psychiatric follow up sessions every
time.
One day, Y’s mother came to the clinic alone, and told Dr
W that Y refused to take the antipsychotics and to come for
follow up. He had thrown away all his medication 3 weeks
earlier and as a result had become actively psychotic again.
He had accused his mother of persecuting him, and had
become very hostile toward her. He had also heard voices
talking about him in an abusive way. The mother asked Dr W
for her son’s regular antipsychotics so that she could
encourage him to take them. Since the mother had always
been the main carer actively involved in Y’s psychiatric care,
and bearing in mind the threat of violence to her, a
prescription was given to her, together with advice on
emergency measures should Y’s condition deteriorate further.
After this encounter, Dr W went on maternity leave.
When Dr W returned to work, she saw the mother alone in
the clinic again, at a time when Y was scheduled to come
back for a follow up visit. The mother described what had
happened since they last met. She had failed to persuade Y to
take the antipsychotics, or to attend for psychiatric follow up.
In desperation, she had started to mix Y’s medication covertly
in his soup. This had had a good effect. He had got better and
was no longer psychotic and hostile to her. Relieving doctors
had continued to supply prescriptions for the mother during
the 3 months that Dr W was away, making notes on Y’s
records stating: ‘‘medication supervised by mother’’. It was
unclear whether the relieving doctors were aware that the
medication was being concealed in Y’s soup. The mother was
very happy with the current arrangement. ‘‘Doctor, just give
me the prescription and I can put the medicine in his soup.’’
DISCUSSION
Conflict between the principles of autonomy and
beneficence/non-maleficence
The pressing issue for Dr W is whether she should continue to
provide Y’s mother with the prescription: this is not a simple
question with a ‘‘Yes’’ or ‘‘No’’ answer. All efforts should be
made to persuade Y to engage with the mental health services
so he can be assessed clinically. It is important to talk to Y’s
mother and other family members about the potential risks,
the relevant ethical and legal issues of covert medication
administration, and the necessity of seeing the patient for
clinical assessment. In this case, however, despite all efforts,
Y refused to see any mental health professional and his mother
continued to ask for a prescription for antipsychotic medication
so that she could carry on giving it to Y in his soup.
It may be argued that because Y was acutely psychotic he
was mentally incapable of making a decision about his
treatment, and so giving him treatment without his consent
was justified. The principle of autonomy was not violated,
and the act was consistent with conventional judicial
tradition. In Hong Kong, any medical and dental treatment
of mentally incapacitated adults is legally governed by the
common law and the Mental Health Ordinance,8 which states
that the legal guardian of a mentally incapacitated adult may
be given the power to consent to treatment. If no guardian is
appointed, the medical practitioners in charge are given the
power to give both urgent and non-urgent treatments to the
mentally incapacitated adult without his consent, provided
that the treatment is given in his best interests. The ‘‘best
interests’’ clause is clearly intended to uphold the principle of
beneficence and non-maleficence.
Even if it was morally justified to give Y medication
without consent, however, the way in which medication was
given might become a subject of debate. Can the moral
justification be extended to include deceiving the patient? If
the answer is negative, it implies that giving treatment to a
mentally incompetent patient such as Y should only be done
openly albeit by force. While this would preserve the principle
of veracity, it is dubious whether administering medication to
a mentally incompetent patient by force is practical or wise.
In the case at hand, we should bear in mind Y’s strong
resistance to taking treatment, as well as his paranoid beliefs
of, and violence toward, his mother. Legal provisions state
that consideration should be given to the administration of
treatment to a mentally incompetent individual in the least
restrictive way.4 It can therefore be argued that concealing
medication in a mentally incompetent patient’s food or drink
may be justified on this basis, and considered as an act of
‘‘weak paternalism’’.
Considerations about continuing to provide prescriptions
for the mother after the patient has recovered from his acute
psychotic episode pose far greater challenges. If we assume
that Y is mentally capable in his remission, (although a
formal assessment has not been made), concealing medica-
tion in Y’s food would constitute an act of ‘‘strong
paternalism’’, in which an autonomous person’s wishes are
overridden on the basis of the principles of beneficence and
non-maleficence. It would be an outright act of deception
which in itself is a harm to the patient. Legally, such an act
may be considered an assault or battery since treatment is
given without a mentally capable patient’s consent.
One option is to stop providing the prescription for the
mother, thus stopping treatment. The discontinuation of
treatment may ‘‘induce’’ a relapse, then antipsychotics can be
started again under formal procedures—for example, com-
pulsory admission. This would ‘‘break the cycle of decep-
tion’’. The question is whether an acute relapse is a
reasonable price to pay for our pursuit of honesty. A relapse
of schizophrenia can lead to many adverse effects. The
immediate ones are more obvious—for example, deteriora-
tion in mental state, risk of harm to self or others. Moreover,
the detrimental effects of untreated psychosis on the long
term prognosis of schizophrenia should not be overlooked. It
has been shown that the longer a schizophrenic patient is
psychotic, especially in the first few years of the illness, the
worse the long term outcome.9 Thus, intentionally disconti-
nuing treatment to break the cycle of deception with a
foreseeable consequence of a relapse causes harm to the
patient and violates the principle of non-maleficence.
Antipsychotics as an autonomy restoring agent
Let us assume we accept the argument that acts of weak
paternalism are justified but not acts of strong paternalism.
Since the covertly administered antipsychotic is an ‘‘auton-
omy restoring’’ agent, it is possible to see the covert
administration of anti psychotic medication as an act shifting
back and forth between weak and strong paternalism,
depending on the patient’s mental capacity. Ideally, when Y
regains mental capacity after receiving covert medication
during his temporary incapacitation, the doctor then employs
other means to persuade him to take medication to prevent
future relapses. If, however, Dr W has no other means to
ensure compliance when Y is competent, we argue that to
discontinue covert medication when that is the only available
means to provide treatment not only violates the principles of
beneficence and non-maleficence, but also Y’s autonomy. In
other words, not only is Y harmed by the relapse of
schizophrenia because of not receiving medication, he also
loses his autonomy during the consequent ‘‘relapse’’. It is
ironic that Y regains his autonomy through covert medica-
tion, and in turn the autonomy so gained disallows the very
medication covertly given, and he loses his autonomy again
in the process. If we withhold covert medication and wait till
Y becomes incompetent again before we resume covert
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medication, it is dubious whether the repetition of covert
medication can any longer be considered an act of ‘‘weak
paternalism’’. For, if before the relapse occurs, the competent
patient explicitly indicates his refusal of antipsychotic
medication, this may constitute a valid advance directive,
so that to provide it when he is in relapse and becomes
incompetent is nothing less than an act of ‘‘strong
paternalism.’’
Balancing family and individual autonomy
Many of our considerations so far involve a weighing of
different clinical factors as applied to Y as an individual.
There should, however, also be a weighing of family rights
against individual rights. In Chinese culture, the notion of
respect for an individual’s right to self determination is a
weak notion due to the Confucian concept of social
personhood.10 Family input in treatment decision making in
Chinese cultures is not only common and considered the
norm, it is often decisive. While Western medical ethics tends
to focus on the individual, this approach has been recognised
as being limited, thus increasing attention has been put on
social relationships and seeing each person within his or her
social context. Many argue that family relationships and
family interests should play a role in patient decision
making,11 12 but there is no consensus as to the extent to
which family interests should count.13
A justification for continuing treatment of the patient with
covert medication can be found in society’s moral obligation
to protect family interests and to preserve family autonomy.
If the patient belongs to a family, then the interests of each
member of the family are interconnected, and there should
be mutual respect for each other’s autonomy. The case
history of the patient clearly indicates that the condition of
the patient profoundly impacts on the welfare and safety of
other family members living with him, and particularly on
his mother. The act of discontinuing covert medication is
intended to respect the patient’s autonomy, but if such an act
carries the potential risk of precipitating a relapse whereby,
not only may the patient lose his capacity for decision
making, but also the autonomy of other family members may
be violated, then the moral validity of the act should be
questioned. Greater harmony between the interests and
autonomy of the patient and those of the other family
members must be achieved. In English speaking countries in
the West, the trend is to emphasise the importance of
protecting patient autonomy because it is believed that a sick
person is less able to protect his or her own interests and
more vulnerable to exploitation by family members. This may
well be true in some cases, and therefore individual
autonomy is generally allowed to trump family autonomy,
but one has to be cautious about a course of action that
entails a disproportionate sacrifice of family interests in order
to protect patient autonomy. In these cases, family interests
and family autonomy should be factored into the patient’s
treatment plans. In the case at hand, this may mean the
continuation of covert medication until other measures are
put in place—for example, patient education—to enable the
patient to take medication voluntarily. In this connection, it
should be added that the doctor and other providers are in a
unique position to play a crucial role in maintaining harmony
between patient and family interests, and in ensuring that
the autonomy of both parties is protected.
Truth telling and autonomy
Should Y be told, at any stage, about his mother giving him
medication in his soup? Obligations of truth telling are
usually justified on the basis of the principle of respect for
autonomy, obligations of fidelity, and the relationship of
trust that is inherent in any interactions between doctor and
patient. Telling patients the truth goes beyond simple
information disclosure for the purpose of making treatment
decisions; it includes a broader definition, encompassing the
accurate and honest communication of information.14 Like
other obligations, however, truth telling is prima facie
binding, but not absolute. There may be situations in which
truth telling and respect for autonomy may be overridden by
beneficence/non-maleficence—for example, in cases des-
cribed as ‘‘benevolent deception’’ (Beauchamp TL,7 p 339)
when telling the truth may produce great harm15 or when
not telling the patient the truth (or the whole truth) is clearly
in the patient’s best interests.16 We believe that the situation
in our case falls within such a category. If Y’s mother’s
actions were disclosed to him, the relationships of trust
between mother and son, and between doctor and patient,
would be likely to break down. The patient would resent
being deceived in this way and would become angry and feel
betrayed. His persecutory beliefs may become more fixed and
he would probably develop an even more negative attitude
toward mental health services and become even more hostile
toward his mother, thus undermining the most reliable
support he has. The possibility that the patient will disengage
himself completely from medical care is a real one, with
predictably disastrous results. Furthermore, the benefits of
disclosure are not very compelling. Clearly it would be
respectful of Y’s autonomy, and telling the truth may also
facilitate efforts at education about the value of antipsychotic
treatment. This presupposes, however, that the patient will
react to the truth (of having been covertly medicated) with
reason and docility, a scenario in which we have little
confidence. Hence, we believe that until the patient is
enlightened to his own need of medication, on balance the
harm of truthful disclosure exceeds benefit.
CONCLUSION
This case of covert medication highlights ethical, clinical, and
legal dilemmas in the management of patients with schizo-
phrenia with poor insight. By adhering to the ‘‘four
principles’’ ethical framework, we conclude that whether
covert medication is ethically and legally justified depends on
a rather delicate and risky balancing act between the respect
for autonomy, and the principles of beneficence and non-
maleficence. In individual cases, the type of medication
given; the extent of the need for the medication; the person
who administers the drug; the purpose of covert administra-
tion, and whether there are any less restrictive alternatives,
are all factors to consider.
Dr W has been placed in a very difficult dilemma in which
neither of the obvious options (stopping the prescription or
continuing with the prescription) seems intuitively right.
Continuing the prescription would keep Y well and keep the
mother safe, but this would be at the expense of Y’s right to
self determination. It would also expose the doctor to
potentially serious legal liabilities because Dr W is writing a
prescription for a patient without seeing him. If Dr W can
persuade Y to see a mental health professional—for example,
a community psychiatric nurse, at least Dr W can provide a
prescription based on the reports of a professional colleague.
Dr W can also obtain further endorsement for her course of
action by consulting with senior colleagues and members of
the multidisciplinary team. Whether and to what extent
these absolve her of her legal liabilities remains unclear, but
it would certainly be preferable to prescribing merely based
on the mother’s report. Furthermore, Y is probably mentally
capable of making a decision about his treatment now, and
therefore consent from him is required. Stopping the
prescription has major implications for Y’s mental health
and for his mother’s safety, however, especially when Y is not
under the surveillance of any mental health professional. This
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course of action may potentially lead to a serious adverse
outcome, and thus would act against the principle of
non-maleficence.
One of Dr W’s major difficulties was not being able to see
and talk to Y directly in order to assess his mental condition
and to impress upon him the values of maintenance
antipsychotics. If only Dr W can talk to Y, there is room for
discussion and education, and these may provide options
other than the two extreme options described above. A
coincidence helped in the resolution of this case. Dr W
received documents from the Social Welfare Department,
stating that Y’s disability allowance needed to be renewed.
This provided a good reason to invite Y back to the clinic for
an assessment of his level of disability. Since Y was keen to
continue to receive financial assistance, he willingly returned
to the psychiatric clinic. Y was assessed to be clinically free of
psychotic symptoms and was found to be mentally capable of
making treatment decisions. A long period of discussion and
education ensued, after which Y finally agreed to accept
psychiatric follow up and medication. By having discussions
about treatment and about financial assistance in the same
session, Dr W was mindful that it could be perceived as
coercive. Although she avoided making any direct links
between Y’s adherence to treatment and his continuing to
receive financial assistance, the extent to which Y still felt
pressure to comply remains unclear. Dr W did not disclose to Y
that his mother had been concealing medication in his soup.
One main concern about covert medication is the lack of
definite guidelines and policies regulating this practice,
leading to fear of litigation17 and hence secrecy surrounding
this practice. The problem of secrecy in turn makes regulation
even more difficult and hence increases the risk of abuse.5
Having said that, this case describes the attempts made by a
loving mother to prevent her son from having a psychotic
relapse; there was no malice or intention to abuse. The good
intentions of the mother make this case more difficult to
resolve. The ethical, legal, and clinical issues surrounding
covert medication are complex and, if possible, guidelines
should be provided to the medical professionals and the
carers of mentally incapacitated adults about how to respond
when covert medication is considered or proposed.
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